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Abstract
This paper explores the role of incentives in the English NHS. Until financial year
2009/10, elective procedures that were cancelled after admission received a fixed
reimbursement associated with a specific healthcare resource group code. We in-
vestigate whether this induced trusts to admit and then cancel, rather than cancel
before admission and/or to cancel low fee over high fee work. As the tariﬀ was
ended in April 2010 we conduct an interrupted time series analysis to examine if
their behaviour was aﬀected after the tariﬀ removal. The results indicate a small,
yet statistically significant, decline in the probability of a last minute cancellation
in the post-tariﬀ period, especially for certain types of patients and diagnoses.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, approximately the 3.5% of elective procedures were cancelled after
patients were admitted to NHS hospitals each year. Such cases are generally termed as
“last minute cancellations” and they lead to waste of time and resources (Lacqua et al.,
1994). Moreover, they may have adverse impacts, emotional or economical, upon both
patients and their families (Ivarsson et al., 2002; Mangram, 1992; Tait et al., 1997).
There is an emerging strand of literature attempting to model the frequency of cancelled
elective procedures. Two recent papers by Cookson et al. (2012) and McIntosh et al.
(2012) have modelled the incidence of last-minute cancellations of elective procedures in
the English National Health Service using patient-level information extracted from the
Hospital Episode Statistics database. Both papers reported that age, gender, day of
admission, socio-economic status and hospital characteristics were significant predictors
of the probability of a procedure being cancelled after admission. An earlier observational
study by Sanjay et al. (2007) investigated the incidence of all cancelled operations and
reported that inconvenient appointments and list overruns were the most common reasons
for cancelling.
Until the financial year 2009/10, each elective procedure that was cancelled after the
patient was admitted, received a specific Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) code for
a “planned procedure not carried out”. This code was associated with a tariﬀ of £469,
known as the WA14Z tariﬀ, and it was a part of the Payment by Results (PbR) system
which was introduced in 2004/05 in order to help NHS providers to use their resources
more eﬃciently and eﬀectively, increase their activity, reduce their waiting times etc.
(Department of Health, 2004).1 Under this system NHS hospitals were reimbursed with
a fixed amount of money every time they cancelled an elective procedure after the patient
was being admitted. The tariﬀ was paid for any planned elective admission (day case or
overnight) that was cancelled on the last minute regardless of the type, cost or length of
the procedure. Rather than compensating providers for a loss of revenue, it was intended
1Tariﬀs change every year responding to changing practices and market conditions. Before 2009/10
planned procedures not carried out were attached to the S22 HRG code and the associated tariﬀ was
£456 in 2008/09, £434 in 2007/08, £423 in 2006/07 etc.
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to be a fixed fee to cover the cost of processing a patient (admission and discharge) when
the provider would no longer receive a payment for that patient otherwise. However,
unlike the other tariﬀs of the PbR system, the one for the cancelled operations did not
reimburse providers for the cost of procedures they actually performed. On the contrary,
its design could generate some adverse eﬀects. As recently discussed by McIntosh et
al. (2012), if the reason for a last-minute cancellation was clinical, then resources that
were originally scheduled to be used to a given elective procedure were left idle and
the opportunity cost of the cancellation exceeded the fixed reimbursement. Since other
patients could have been treated instead and providers were reimbursed less than the
actual cost of cancellation, this led to social waste. If providers should be reimbursed for
not performing a procedure as planned in order to cover their revenue loss, they should
be compensated with the actual cost of the last minute cancellation, which depends upon
the particular procedure and patient characteristics.
However, the literature suggests that elective procedures are cancelled on the last
minute mainly due to non-clinical reasons (Dexter et al., 2005; Pollard et al., 1996; van
Klei et al., 2002; Sanjay et al., 2007). Whilst the WA14Z tariﬀ was certainly lower
than the total cost of aborting a procedure, since patients and their families were not
reimbursed for their own costs, it was likely that the WA14Z tariﬀ was greater than the
hospital’s last minute cancellation cost alone; the hospital was reimbursed for any other
procedures it carried out as planned. Apart from being socially wasteful, the design
of the WA14Z tariﬀ provided hospitals with a disincentive to reduce their non-clinical
last-minute cancellation rates since they were claiming reimbursements for both the last-
minute cancellations and the other procedures they performed as scheduled. Moreover,
the tariﬀs for some procedures were lower than the WA14Z one (McIntosh et al., 2012).
In fact, according to the 2009/10 mandatory prices information spreadsheet for admitted
patient care, the WA14Z tariﬀ was lying in the 28th percentile of the distribution of
planned same day tariﬀs. As noted in the 2007-2008 NHS Admitted Patient Mandatory
Tariﬀ, minor endoscopic procedures on the bladder or diagnostic procedures on the stom-
ach were attached to lower tariﬀs, so that providers could receive a greater reimbursement
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by cancelling them after admission rather than performing them as originally scheduled.
Given all the above, the design of the WA14Z tariﬀ was deemed problematic and inef-
fective. Furthermore, it had also substantial cost implications. Prior to mid-2010, more
than 15,000 elective procedures were cancelled at the last minute each quarter on aver-
age. Hence, approximately £6.5 million each quarter was reimbursed to NHS providers
for an activity they did not actually carry out, irrespective of other opportunity costs for
hospitals and patients.
This paper investigates whether the design of this fixed tariﬀ provided hospitals with
an incentive to cancel procedures at the last minute and/or to cancel low tariﬀ elective
procedures in favour of higher tariﬀ work. Fixed price reimbursements may often provide
hospitals with an incentive to game the system by practising cost-driven patient selection
(Propper et al., 2004; Propper and Van Reenen, 2010). Cookson and Laucidella (2011)
examined the possibility that providers may select against socio-economically disadvan-
taged hip-replacement patients, although they did not find strong evidence to support
their hypothesis regarding incentives for patient selection. In the case of last-minute
cancellations, however, the 2010 tariﬀ removal oﬀers a more appropriate setting which
allows a thorough investigation regarding the existence of financial incentives to cancel
a planned operation in the English NHS. More specifically, since financial year 2010/11
the HRG code associated with a last-minute cancellation was excluded from the scope
of the mandatory tariﬀ (Payments by Results Guidance 2010-11). This means that NHS
providers can no longer claim a fixed reimbursement once they cancel a procedure after
a patient’s admission. Hence, if the tariﬀ provided hospitals with an incentive to can-
cel an elective procedure at the last minute following a selective behaviour, its removal
may have had a direct impact on their behaviour by decreasing the probability for a
patient’s procedure to be cancelled after his admission for non-clinical reasons. To ex-
plore this hypothesis, we make use of detailed patient-level data on elective procedures
in all the English NHS trusts from January 1st of 2009 to December 31st of 2011. A
before-and-after design is applied to evaluate whether the trend of last-minute cancella-
tions has declined in the period after the tariﬀ removal. Our results indicate a small,
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yet statistically significant decline in the probability of a last minute cancellation since
the second quarter of 2010, especially for certain types of patients and diagnoses. Hav-
ing controlled for patient and provider-level heterogeneity we interpret our findings as
evidence favouring that removing a problematic tariﬀ was eﬀective.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the estimation
strategy. Section 3 outlines the data used in the analysis. Section 4 discusses the obtained
results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
Our analysis focuses on evaluating the impact, if any, of the tariﬀ removal regarding
the fixed reimbursement associated with last minute cancellations in the English NHS.
Whether NHS providers had an incentive to admit a patient and then cancel the procedure
or to cancel low fee work over high fee work, we seek to investigate if this incentive has
weakened after the exclusion of that HRG code from the scope of the mandatory tariﬀ.
The tariﬀ reform was introduced in the beginning of financial year 2010/11 (April) and it
was applied to all NHS providers as it was part of the PbR system. Therefore there are no
distinct treated and control providers so that a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences or a propensity
score matching approach can be used. However, given that our data are suﬃciently
distributed before and after the intervention, we can adopt another quasi-experimental
research design based on a before-and-after approach.2 Since there is no theoretical reason
to expect a sharp change in the behaviour of providers right after the tariﬀ removal we
estimate interrupted time series models which allow for a more gradual adjustment of
their behaviour over time. This method has a potentially high degree of internal validity
and has been widely used in healthcare research (Bernal et al., 2016; Cooper et al., 2011;
Huesch et al., 2012; Linden, 2015).3 In the absence of treated and comparison groups,
the standard interrupted time series model assumes the following functional form:
2Some methodological concerns on measuring health policy interventions are compactly reviewed by
Huesch et al. (2012).
3Cooper et al. (2011) also used interrupted time series models to estimate probabilities at the patient
level. However, as they could define treated and control providers they performed a multiple-group
analysis.
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where yitj is an indicator for whether the procedure for the i-th patient admitted in the
j-th NHS provider during month t was cancelled on the last minute (hence, the associated
HRG code was WA14Z). Variable t is a running counter of months since January of 2009
which is the first month in our data and ~t specifies the tariﬀ removal introduced at the
first month (April) of the 2010/11 financial year. Therefore, 1 is the trajectory of the
cancellation probability before the tariﬀ removal, 2 measures the step change of the
outcome after the tariﬀ removal and 3 is the slope change in the post-tariﬀ period. The
latter is compared to the counterfactual, i.e. the pre-intervention trend that is assumed to
had remained unchanged throughout the period in the absence of the tariﬀ reform. Given
the functional form of the model considered here this is the identification assumption of
the analysis (Huesch et al., 2012). Statistically significant p-values in 2 or 3 will indicate
an immediate or a gradual treatment eﬀect over time, respectively (Linden, 2015). Chow
tests for the existence of a structural break in the series at the beginning of financial year
2010/11 are also performed (H0: 2 = 3 = 0).
The model also controls for patient and provider-level heterogeneity although an ad-
vantage of the interrupted time series approach is that it is not aﬀected from time-varying
confounders which evolve slowly over time (Bernal et al., 2016). More specifically, there
are controls for gender, age, ethnicity, waiting time between referral and admission, trans-
fer to another provider, diagnosis chapter heading, socioeconomic status of the area where
the patient permanently lives into, discharge to the usual place of residence and controls
about the day of the week the admission took place. At the provider level, the model
controls for the hospital type, e.g. university teaching hospital, specialist hospital, foun-
dation trust etc. However, the observed hospital type remains unchanged during the
period considered here and these controls are omitted when we allow for provider-specific
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intercepts;  is a set of provider-level fixed eﬀects that capture all time invariant provider
heterogeneity. Also,  denotes the month of admission and captures seasonal eﬀects and
 is the error term. We model the probability of a last minute cancellation using OLS,
although we probe the robustness of the results using logistic and complementary log-log
regressions given that last-minute cancellations are rare (Cookson et al., 2012).4 The
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the provider level in
order to allow for common error components for patients admitted to the same provider.
We also conduct the analysis at the provider level taking into account the fractional
nature of the response variable and controlling for provider fixed eﬀects.
3 Data
We use the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES hereafter) database which contains anony-
mous administrative patient data. The original sample consisted of 22,005,931 observa-
tions of NHS patients who underwent elective procedures from January 2009 to December
2011 in various NHS facilities. After removing all the observations with missing data on
key variables used in the analysis, we were left with 18,659,096 observations. A brief
inspection did not indicate any correlation between missing data and particular provider
or patient-level characteristics. The dependent variable a binary indicator of whether an
elective procedure was cancelled after admission, i.e. whether a WA14Z HRG code was
attached. There is no way of knowing what procedure had been originally planned since
all cancelled operations are coded as WA14Z.
The patient characteristics include gender, age, ethnicity, waiting time, transferring
to another provider, diagnosis chapter heading, socio-economic status, the Charlson co-
morbidity index, discharge to the usual place of residence and indicators regarding the
day and month of admission. The diagnosis chapter headings follow the 10th Revision
of the International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10).
These diagnostic codes are used alongside with procedural codes (OPCS Classification of
4The estimation of linear probability models is quite common in the empirical literature and has
been used in many healthcare studies (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Cooper et al., 2011).
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Interventions and Procedures, not available in our HES extract) to capture every detail
of a clinical event and determine the HRG codes. The admitted patients contained in
our data can be classified into 1,574 3-digit alphanumeric diagnosis codes which can be
aggregated to 20 chapters (see Table A1 in the Appendix for the full definition of the
admissions examined here).5 The socioeconomic status of patients is based on the so-
cioeconomic quintile of their residence area and it is measured using the 2007 Index of
Multiple Deprivation at the super output area (DCLG, 2007).6 Waiting time measures
the time between the referral of a patient and his admission for the procedure. Because
of its skewed distribution, it is expressed in logarithms. The modified Charlson comor-
bidity index captures potential need and complexity of each procedure (Bottle and Aylin,
2011). The transfer indicator variable is included since hospitals may transfer a patient
to another provider or admit a patient to a ward instead of cancelling the procedure
(Cookson et al., 2013). Individual time dummy variables indicate the day of week and
the month of year the patient was admitted for a procedure. Provider characteristics
include binary variables indicating the hospital type, i.e. whether it was a secondary
care provider, a foundation trust, a university or a specialist hospital.7 Table 1 displays
the descriptive statistics on some key variables used in the analysis regarding the total
period as well as before and after the tariﬀ removal. Approximately 3% of the planned
procedures are being cancelled on the last minute, with a small statistically significant
decrease being observed in the post-tariﬀ period. Regarding the other variables, their
diﬀerences in means between the two periods are statistically significant in most cases,
however, a brief inspection revealed that they have evolved rather slowly over time so
they are not expected to violate the underlying assumptions of the segmented regression
5There were 4 patients classified into a special purposes code (U049) but they were excluded from
the analysis due to missing information on other key variables.
6The index is constructed from 38 indicators across 7 weighted domains measuring an area’s income,
deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation and disability, education, skills and training,
barriers to housing and service, crime and the local environment. The index is produced periodically for
the Department of Communities and Local Government by the University of Oxford. The raw scores are
meaningless and are categorized into quintiles since it is the relative deprivation that is relevant.
7Some patients were admitted to mental health and community care providers: 161,346 (0.73%)
and 3,837 (0.02%) in the original sample, respectively. Moreover, due to the lack of information on
key characteristics, they represent even smaller fractions in the utilized sample of non-missing values:
28,836 patients (0.15%) were admitted to mental health providers and only 9 (0.00%) to community care
providers.
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analysis design adopted here (Bernal et al., 2016; Huesch et al., 2012). This is important,
especially for variables that could be considered as outcomes such as waiting time. How-
ever, given their small time variance over the period and because previous studies have
used them as patient level controls when modelling last minute cancellations (Cookson
et al., 2013) they are not omitted from the explanatory vector and their inclusion or not
does not aﬀect the results. Moreover, controlling for the composition of the admitted
population as well as for time and provider fixed eﬀects will mitigate any biases.
[Table 1 about here]
[Figure 1a about here]
[Figure 1b about here]
The evolution of the cancellation rate is shown in Figures 1a and 1b. Figure 1a
presents the average monthly cancelling rate over the total period. There seems to be a
small decrease after the tariﬀ removal however the time series plot is dominated by month
eﬀects. In order to remove them we regressed the incidence of last minute cancellation
on month of admission indicators and plotted the mean residuals in Figure 1b where the
decrease, although small, is more apparent. This can also be seen in Figure 2 where the
relative frequency distribution of the cancellation rate across providers before and after
the tariﬀ change is depicted.8 Moreover, the observed decline of the cancellation proba-
bility is statistically significant. Table 2 reports the cancellation rate before and after the
tariﬀ change for all admissions and for a series of sub-samples, namely by provider type
and diagnosis chapter heading. There is descriptive evidence for a statistically significant
incidence of last minute cancellations in the post-tariﬀ period for patients admitted to
foundation trusts and teaching hospitals as well as for certain ICD codes, e.g. infectious
diseases, neoplasms, diseases of the musculoskeletal system, nervous system diseases, dis-
eases of the digestive system, skin-related diseases, while the cancellation rate appears
8The upper and lower 1% tails of the distributions have been trimmed to avoid distortions caused
from outliers (the mass of providers with a zero cancellation rate is higher in the post-tariﬀ period).
Results available upon request.
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increased for some others, e.g. diseases of the eye and adnexa, diseases of the genitouri-
nary system. Although small, the observed figures for last-minute cancellations are quite
accurate because the HRG codes are tied to hospital reimbursement. Regarding some
demographic characteristics, the cancellation probability has declined for females, those
below 30 years old and those with a white ethnic background.9
[Figure 2 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
4 Results
Table 3 displays the results from modelling the incidence of a last minute cancellation
at the patient level. In Panel A we performed the estimation on the full sample of
patients with non-missing values on key variables. The model is progressively saturated to
control for a variable indicating the removal of the tariﬀ at the beginning of financial year
2010/11 (April 2010), period specific time trends, patient and provider characteristics,
time fixed eﬀects and time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the provider level. As
seen in the first two columns, the average cancellation rate is slightly above 3% and the
probability of being cancelled seems to slightly decline after the tariﬀ removal. Next, we
condition the cancellation probability on a set of patient and provider-specific variables.
Patient heterogeneity is captured using controls for gender (males are the base group), age
(patients aged less than 9 years are the reference category), ethnic background (patients of
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or any other Asian background are the base ethnic group
classified as “Indian”), waiting time between referral and admission, a binary indicator of
whether the patient was transferred to another provider, a binary indicator of whether
the patient was discharged to his usual place of residence (rather to the temporary place
of residence, a security institution, care home etc.), diagnosis chapter heading (certain
infectious and parasitic diseases are the reference diagnosis category) and socioeconomic
status of the patient’s permanent residence area using quintiles of the 2007 IMD at the
9Results not shown here but are available from the authors upon request.
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super output area (the lowest quintile is the base one). Provider characteristics include
indicators regarding the observed hospital type, i.e. foundation trust, teaching hospital,
specialist hospital, mental health hospital, community care provider and secondary care
provider, but these are time invariant and they are removed from the specifications which
control for provider-specific intercepts. Controlling for observed patient and provider
characteristics in columns 3 and 4 does not seem to aﬀect the magnitude and the sign
of the estimated coeﬃcient of interest (3, the post-tariﬀ linear time trend) but there
is also evidence for a statistically significant negative step change and a positive secular
trend as well. However, controlling for time fixed eﬀects (month and day of admission)
and time invariant provider heterogeneity in columns 5 and 6 leads to the rejection of
the hypothesis about the existence of a sharp change right after the tariﬀ removal. Also
the coeﬃcient of the secular trend is now very low and marginally significant at the 10%
level. The results from the full model specification seem to favour the existence of a
slope change in the cancellation probability. Moreover a series of Chow tests performed
in columns 2-6 also justify the existence of a structural break at the introduction of the
2010/11 PbR system (H0: 2 = 3 = 0).
In panel B we probe the robustness of the baseline results by re-estimating the full
model specification on various alternative sub-samples. In column 1, we restrict the
sample to patients with length of stay less than a day since cases with greater length of
stay are atypical and may confound the analysis (Cooper et al., 2009). A similar point has
been made by Cookson et al. (2013) who mentioned that any last-minute cancellations
would normally occur shortly after admission. On the other hand, longer stays are more
likely to result from complications or complexities not necessarily related to the elective
procedure. The obtained results lead to the same conclusions regarding the existence
of a slight but statistically significant slope change after the tariﬀ removal. In column
2 of panel B we restrict the sample to patients admitted to secondary care providers
as this is common when performing secondary care analysis (primary care providers,
mental health and community trusts do not often perform the same types of procedures).
Similarly, in column 3 of panel B we exclude patients admitted to mental health and
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community care providers and in column 4 we include only those patients who were
discharged to their usual place of residence.10 In column 4 we combine the restrictions
about length of stay shorter than a day and discharge to the usual place or residence
while in column 5 we impose all the aforementioned conditions simultaneously. Hence,
the most restricted sample (column 6 of panel B) consists of patients with length of stay
shorter than a day who were admitted to a secondary care provider (not to mental or
community care providers) and who were discharged to their usual place of residence. The
results are nearly identical to those reported in column 6 of panel A and indicate that
the probability of being cancelled on the last minute declined by approximately 0.012%
each month in the post-tariﬀ period. Full results listing coeﬃcients and t-statistics on
the rest regressors of the models presented in column 6 of Table 3 are available in the
Appendix Table A2.
[Table 3 about here]
Overall, the results indicate that providers seem to have responded to the tariﬀ change,
even if the estimated eﬀect is small. The estimations on the full and the restricted sam-
ples suggest that the last minute cancellation probability for elective procedures has been
declining by 0.012% each month, on average, during the post-tariﬀ period, or approxi-
mately 3,000 less last-minute cancellations each month. In other words, removing a rather
problematic tariﬀ generated savings of about £14 million each month during the period
examined here and prevented the adverse eﬀects for a large number of patients. The
same conclusions are drawn if we collapse our dataset and conduct the analysis at the
provider level, given that we seek to test for any changes in the behaviour of providers
in the post-reform period. In this case, given that the dependent variable is by con-
struction bounded between 0 and 1, we estimate equation 1 using a fractional response
(logit) model allowing for provider-specific intercepts (Hardin & Hilbe, 2007; Hausman &
Leonard, 1997; Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). The results are provided in Table 4. In panel
10A cross tabulation over the total sample indicated the existence of substantial diﬀerences regarding
the length of stay among patients with various destinations of discharge. Patients who were discharged
to their usual place of residence had had a mean length of stay shorter than a day, while the mean length
of stay of patients discharged elsewhere was approximately 19 days. More detailed results are available
upon request.
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A we have collapsed the dataset of all patients with non-missing values on key variables
and in panel B we restrict the sample to secondary, non-mental health, non-community
care providers. The results are quite similar to those obtained from the patient-level
analysis and confirm the existence of a break, indicating a slightly declining trajectory
of the cancellation rate after the removal of the tariﬀ. Given the robustness of the find-
ing across model specifications and levels of analysis, we interpret it as evidence of a
slightly altered behaviour of providers regarding the last-minute cancellations of planned
procedures. As a test to ensure that the model used here is not misspecified, we set
some pre-policy counterfactual tariﬀ removal dates (one, three and six months) before
the oﬃcial one in April 2010 and run a series of placebo regressions using the full model
specification. Hence, we tested for any anticipation eﬀects regarding the tariﬀ removal
although it was not something widely discussed before the introduction of the 2010/11
PbR system. However, the placebo regressions did not produce statistically significant
evidence of a post-cancellation slope change.11
[Table 4 about here]
However, the tariﬀ removal may have had a diﬀerentiated impact across types of
patients. In accordance to the literature (Cookson et al., 2013; McIntosh et al., 2012)
our estimations have shown that patients with specific demographic characteristics are
more likely to be cancelled on the last minute. Also the cancellation probability varies
by diagnosis chapter, therefore some procedures are more likely to be cancelled than
others, for example if they are minor procedures or they are attached to tariﬀs lower
than the WA14Z (or the S22 before the financial year 2009/10). Therefore, we estimated
the full model specification (column 6, Table 3) on a series of sub-samples defined by
demographic characteristics (age, gender, ethnic group, socioeconomic status), diagnosis
code and provider type. Table 5 reports the results for the restricted sample, i.e. the one
corresponding to panel B of Table 3, although the results are quite similar even when the
11More specifically, for the patient-level models the estimated coeﬃcients of the post-tariﬀ time trend
were (t-stats in parentheses): -.00013 (-2.33), -.0008 (-1.14) and -.00011 (-1.22) for setting the tariﬀ
removal one, three and six months before the oﬃcial date, respectively. For the provider-level regres-
sions, the corresponding figures were -.00015 (-1.54), -.00006 (-0.53) and -.00017 (-1.11). The estimated
coeﬃcients of the period indicator were also zero. Results available upon request.
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full sample of patients with non-missing values is used. The decline in the cancellation
probability seems to be slightly greater for males. With respect to age it is mostly driven
by patients aged between 60 and 90 years old. The decline is also stronger for patients
with an Indian ethnic background and for those living in more deprived areas. Regarding
the type of provider, there is weak evidence about a structural break in the case of
specialist hospitals but in general there is not significant diﬀerentiation across provider
types.
Moreover, the reduction in the last-minute cancellation probability seems to be greater
for certain types of diagnoses, namely for infectious and parasitic diseases (ICD-I), dis-
eases of the blood and certain disorders involving the immune mechanism (ICD-III),
diseases of the ear (ICD-VIII) and symptoms and signs (ICD-XVIII). This provides some
justification about last minute cancellations of minor procedures that are attached to
lower tariﬀs (prior to its removal, the WA14Z tariﬀ was lying in the 28th percentile of
the 2009/10 distribution of planned same day tariﬀs). According to the 2009/10 tariﬀ
information spreadsheet there were several HRG codes attached to tariﬀs lower than the
WA14Z one and were associated with ICD-10 diagnosis chapters for which the cancella-
tion probability followed a downward slopping post-reform trajectory, e.g. thalassaemia,
pleurisy, disorders of immunity without HIV/AIDS, thrombocytopenia, minor and inter-
mediate ear disorders, etc. Ideally, we would be able to know what kind of operation
would have been carried out, however, there is no way to acquire this information be-
cause all cancelled operations are coded as WA14Z rather than as the originally planned
procedure (McIntosh et al., 2012).12 Knowing this information could enable us to test the
extent to which providers responded to the tariﬀ removal on an individual basis. Also, a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences style estimator comparing procedures with high versus low tariﬀs
(relative to WA14Z) before and after the reform could have been used. Moreover, we do
not know if the procedure was cancelled for clinical or non-clinical reasons, as the latter
12A reasonable proxy would be to use the HES ID of patients who were cancelled on the last minute
and check if they had a further elective admission in the same ICD-10 diagnosis chapter within a short
period after the cancellation. However, lack of Information Governance Clearance to hold HES ID (or an
encrypted version of it) restricts us from devising such a proxy. Moreover, using data from April 2013 to
November 2016 we note that there are 172,062 elective admissions with WA14Z, 65.5% of which had a
subsequent elective admission within 90 days and 54% of them had the same ICD 10 diagnosis chapter.
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could be considered of greater relevance since the literature suggests that the reasons of
last minute cancellations of elective procedures are mainly non-clinical (e.g. Dexter et al.,
2005; Sanjay et al., 2007). However, given the design of the WA14Z tariﬀ and its relative
position over the tariﬀ distribution one can argue about the existence of an incentive to
cancel a planned procedure after admission and test this hypothesis using the timing of
the tariﬀ removal.
[Table 5 about here]
5 Conclusions
In this article we attempted to evaluate a recent tariﬀ reform for cancelled elective pro-
cedures in the English NHS. Until financial year 2009/10 providers were able to claim
a fixed reimbursement of £469 for procedures that were cancelled after the patient was
admitted. Given the fact that the tariﬀ associated with last minute cancellations was
abolished in April 2010, we seek to explore whether it acted as an incentive for providers
to cancel at the last minute and/or cancel low tariﬀ procedures in favour of receiving the
fixed reimbursement or higher tariﬀ work. In order to do so, we compared their behaviour
regarding last minute cancellations before and after the tariﬀ elimination. A main as-
sumption we make is that if the tariﬀ did operate as an incentive for trusts, its removal
would result in a decreasing probability of a procedure being cancelled on the last minute
in the post-tariﬀ period. However, due to the fact the the tariﬀ removal was applied to all
NHS providers under the 2010/11 Payment by Results framework, there was no way to
define treated and control providers. Moreover, as there was no information on what pro-
cedure was originally planned to be carried out, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences style estimator
could not be adopted either. Instead, as common in the healthcare literature we followed
an interrupted time series approach to examine if there was a change in the behaviour
of providers regarding last minute cancellation in the post-reform period. Based on an
extract of the Hospital Episode Statistics data between January of 2009 and December of
2011 we present evidence of a statistically significant decline of the last minute cancella-
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tion probability during the post-tariﬀ period. The results were consistent across several
model specifications, sub-samples and levels of analyses, indicating a slight decrease in
the incidence of last minute cancellations after controlling for patient and provider level
heterogeneity. Moreover, the decline was found to be more pronounced for specific groups
of patients and diagnosis types. Although there is no way of knowing what operation
was originally planned to be carried out or whether the reason of the cancellation was
clinical or non-clinical, we interpret that finding as evidence of hospitals’ response to the
tariﬀ change. The magnitude of the estimates presented here indicate that even if the
incentive to cancel was not very strong, removing a problematic tariﬀ resulted into fewer
cancellations, preventing the adverse eﬀects for a large number of patients, and generated
additional savings.
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Figures & Tables
(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Source: Hospital Episode Statistics, 2009m1-2011m12.
Notes:(a) Tariﬀ removal is indicated by the black vertical line. Dashed red line is running
mean lowess smoothing line. Green lines are period-specific linear fit lines. (b) Mean
monthly cancellation after removing the month eﬀect.
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Figure 2: Cancellation rate distribution across providers before and after the tariﬀ re-
moval.
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics, 2009m1-2011m12.
Notes: Navy lines are Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of the cancellation rate
distributions. Red lines are overlaid normal density curves.
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Table 1: Summary statistics overall and by period.
Total period Before tariﬀ removal After tariﬀ removal t-test
Variable name Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. p-value
Cancelled procedure .0309 .1731 .0311 .1736 .0308 .1728 .0001a
Female .5283 .4992 .5291 .4991 .5277 .4992 .0000a
Age: 0-9 years .0411 .1984 .0411 .1986 .0410 .1983 .3093
Age: 10-19 years .0380 .1912 .0390 .1936 .0373 .1895 .0000a
Age: 20-29 years .0637 .2443 .0650 .2465 .0628 .2427 .0000a
Age: 30-39 years .0840 .2773 .0866 .2813 .0821 .2745 .0000a
Age: 40-49 years .1311 .3376 .1323 .3389 .1303 .3366 .0000a
Age: 50-59 years .1524 .3594 .1518 .3588 .1528 .3598 .0000a
Age: 60-69 years .2026 .4019 .1998 .3998 .2045 .4034 .0000a
Age: 70-79 years .1840 .3875 .1829 .3866 .1847 .3881 .0000a
Age: 80-89 years .0935 .2912 .0926 .2899 .0942 .2921 .0000a
Age: 90 years .0096 .0976 .0089 .0937 .0101 .1002 .0000a
Ethnic group: Indian .0378 .1908 .0361 .1866 .0390 .1936 .0000a
Ethnic group: Black .0203 .1411 .0208 .1427 .0200 .1401 .0000a
Ethnic group: Chinese .0023 .0477 .0022 .0471 .0023 .0481 .0000a
Ethnic group: White .8183 .3856 .8089 .3932 .8248 .3801 .0000a
Ethnic group: Other .0172 .1298 .0165 .1273 .0176 .1316 .0000a
Ethnic group: Unknown .1041 .3054 .1155 .3196 .0962 .2949 .0000a
Waiting time (log) 3.3143 1.3148 3.3099 1.3020 3.3173 1.3236 .0000a
Transferred .0029 .0542 .0032 .0568 .0028 .0524 .0000a
Discharged home .9923 .0876 .9919 .0894 .9925 .0864 .0000a
Deprivation index: I .1956 .3966 .1941 .3955 .1966 .3974 .0000a
Deprivation index: II .2168 .4121 .2166 .4119 .2170 .4122 .0314b
Deprivation index: III .2104 .4076 .2110 .4080 .2100 .4073 .0000a
Deprivation index: IV .1949 .3961 .1955 .3966 .1945 .3958 .0000a
Deprivation index: V .1823 .3861 .1829 .3866 .1818 .3857 .0000a
Charlson score 1.7050 4.1191 1.4989 3.8665 1.8478 4.2795 .0000a
ICD chapter: I .0023 .0483 .0023 .0480 .0024 .0486 .0087b
ICD chapter: II .1728 .3781 .1688 .3746 .1755 .3804 .0000a
ICD chapter: III .0200 .1401 .0198 .1393 .0202 .1406 .0000a
ICD chapter: IV .0142 .1182 .0138 .1165 .0144 .1193 .0000a
ICD chapter: V .0014 .0372 .0015 .0386 .0013 .0362 .0000a
ICD chapter: VI .0257 .1583 .0251 .1565 .0261 .1595 .0000a
ICD chapter: VII .0824 .2749 .0833 .2764 .0817 .2739 .0000a
ICD chapter: VIII .0103 .1010 .0108 .1033 .0100 .0994 .0000a
ICD chapter: IX .0572 .2322 .0583 .2343 .0564 .2307 .0000a
ICD chapter: X .0229 .1496 .0234 .1512 .0226 .1486 .0000a
ICD chapter: XI .1810 .3850 .1788 .3832 .1826 .3863 .0000a
ICD chapter: XII .0222 .1475 .0234 .1513 .0214 .1447 .0000a
ICD chapter: XIII .1364 .3432 .1365 .3433 .1363 .3432 .3925
ICD chapter: XIV .0837 .2769 .0868 .2816 .0815 .2737 .0000a
ICD chapter: XV .0111 .1049 .0118 .1081 .0106 .1025 .0000a
ICD chapter: XVI .0003 .0166 .0002 .0157 .0003 .0172 .0000a
ICD chapter: XVII .0116 .1071 .0117 .1074 .0115 .1068 .0107b
ICD chapter: XVIII .0633 .2434 .0643 .2453 .0625 .2421 .0000a
ICD chapter: XIX .0184 .1344 .0177 .1320 .0188 .1359 .0000a
ICD chapter: XXI .0628 .2426 .0615 .2403 .0637 .2427 .0000a
Foundation trust .5009 .5000 .5020 .5000 .5001 .5000 .0000a
University hospital .3815 .4858 .3778 .4848 .3841 .4864 .0000a
Specialist hospital .0400 .1959 .0404 .1969 .0397 .1951 .0000a
Secondary care provider .9569 .2031 .9591 .1980 .9553 .2066 .0000a
Observations 18,659,096 7,635,636 11,023,460
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2009m1-2011m12. Full sample of patients with
non-missing values on key variables. ap < :001; bp < :05; cp < :01
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Table 2: Cancellation rate by various subgroups before and after the tariﬀ removal.
Subgroup Total period Before tariﬀ removal After tariﬀ removal t-test
Total sample .0309 (.1731) .0311 (.1736) .0308 (.1728) .0001a
Foundation trust .0294 (.1689) .0297 (.1690) .0291 (.1683) .0000a
University hospital .0327 (.1778) .0331 (.1789) .0324 (.1771) .0000a
Specialist hospital .0291 (.1680) .0292 (.1683) .0289 (.1677) .6410
ICD chapter: I .0174 (.1309) .0191 (.1368) .0163 (.1267) .0315b
ICD chapter: II .0193 (.1375) .0199 (.1398) .0188 (.1360) .0000a
ICD chapter: III .0197 (.1389) .0193 (.1376) .0199 (.1397) .1670
ICD chapter: IV .0280 (.1649) .0284 (.1662) .0277 (.1641) .2468
ICD chapter: V .0134 (.1149) .0126 (.1113) .0141 (.1177) .2984
ICD chapter: VI .0167 (.1281) .0173 (.1302) .0163 (.1267) .0143a
ICD chapter: VII .0337 (.1805) .0328 (.1780) .0344 (.1822) .0000a
ICD chapter: VIII .0375 (.1899) .0376 (.1903) .0374 (.1897) .7633
ICD chapter: IX .0326 (.1776) .0326 (.1777) .0326 (.1776) .8644
ICD chapter: X .0376 (.1906) .0383 (.1919) .0374 (.1897) .1283
ICD chapter: XI .0242 (.1536) .0244 (.1542) .0240 (.1532) .0560c
ICD chapter: XII .0351 (.1840) .0360 (.1863) .0344 (.1823) .0053a
ICD chapter: XIII .0306 (.1724) .0316 (.1750) .0299 (.1705) .0000a
ICD chapter: XIV .0371 (.1889) .0367 (.1880) .0374 (.1897) .0243b
ICD chapter: XV .0127 (.1120) .0139 (.1169) .0118 (.1081) .0000a
ICD chapter: XVI .0215 (.1451) .0224 (.1479) .0210 (.1435) .7519
ICD chapter: XVII .0403 (.1968) .0406 (.1973) .0401 (.1964) .6523
ICD chapter: XVIII .0508 (.2197) .0494 (.2168) .0519 (.2217) .0000a
ICD chapter: XIX .0367 (.1879) .0374 (.1897) .0362 (.1868) .0719c
ICD chapter: XXI .0554 (.2288) .0543 (.2266) .0562 (.2303) .0000a
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2009m1-2011m12. Full sample of patients with
non-missing values on key variables. Standard deviations in parentheses. For the t-test, the
p-values are reported. ap < :001; bp < :05; cp < :01.
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Table 3: Modelling last-minute cancellations at the patient level.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A: Results for the full sample
Post-tariﬀ indicator -.00028 -.00082b -.00086a -.00080b .00009 -.00001
(-0.81) (-2.44) (-2.63) (-2.47) (0.25) (0.03)
Time trend - .00012a .00012a .00012a .00006 .00007c
(3.21) (3.17) (3.36) (1.67)c (1.81)
Post-tariﬀ time trend - -.00014a -.00013a -.00014a -.00011a -.00011a
(-3.39) (-3.21) (-3.40) (-2.77) (-2.77)
Patient controls No No Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa
Provider controls No No No Yesa Yesa No
Time fixed eﬀects No No No No Yesa Yesa
Provider fixed eﬀects No No No No No Yesa
R-squared .0000 .0000 .0055 .0061 .0063 .0080
Chow test (F -stat) - 7.23a 7.01a 7.33a 5.36b 4.26b
Patients 18,659,096
Providers 301
Panel B: Results for alternative restricted samples
Post-tariﬀ indicator .00039 -.00008 -.00001 -.00003 .00031 .00030
(0.90) (-0.22) (-0.03) (-0.07) (0.71) (0.67)
Time trend .00007 .00006 .00007c .00007c .00006 .00006
(1.63) (1.51) (1.80) (1.80) (1.28) (1.24)
Post-tariﬀ time trend -.00014a -.00010b -.00011a -.00011a -.00012b -.00012b
(-2.75) (-2.49) (-2.75) (-2.75) (-2.44) (-2.40)
Patient controls Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa
Provider controls No No No No No No
Time fixed eﬀects Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa
Provider fixed eﬀects Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa
R-squared .0104 .0074 .0080 .0080 .0098 .0098
Chow test (F -stat) 5.38a 3.39b 4.22b 4.14b 4.24b 4.04b
Patients 14,844,816 17,854,568 18,630,260 18,514,651 14,202,494 14,156,288
Providers 265 213 253 297 197 171
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2009m1-2011m12.
Notes: OLS estimates. t-statistics in parentheses have been calculated using standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by provider. ap < :001; bp < :05; cp < :01
(for groups of variables they indicate the results of a joint significance test). Chow test H0:
2 = 3 = 0. In Panel B the estimation samples are as follows: Length of stay<1 day (Col-
umn 1), admitted to a secondary care provider (Column 2), excluding those admitted in men-
tal or community care providers (Column 3), discharged home (Column 4), Length of stay<1
day & admitted to a secondary care provider (Column 5), all previous restrictions imposed
simultaneously (Column 6).
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Table 4: Modelling last-minute cancellations at the provider level.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A: Results for the full sample
Post-tariﬀ indicator .00082 (1.48) .00007 (0.10) -.00042 (-1.05) .00007 (0.16)
Time trend - .00013 (1.93)c .00014 (3.19)a .00011 (2.28)b
Post-tariﬀ time trend - -.00014 (-1.75)c -.00012 (-2.18)b -.00011 (-2.14)b
Provider fixed eﬀects Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa
Patient controls No No Yesa Yesa
Time fixed eﬀects No No No Yesa
Pseudo R-squared .0647 .0647 .0746 .0749
Chow test (F -stat) - 3.11 5.13c 4.95c
Observations 8,763 8,763 8,763 8,763
Providers 301 301 301 301
Panel B: Results for the restricted sample
Post-tariﬀ indicator .00080 (0.21) -.00107 (-3.01)a -.00141 (-3.86)amc -.00072 (-1.73)c
Time trend - .00014 (3.63)a .00011 (2.55)b .00006 (1.28)
Post-tariﬀ time trend - -.00013 (-2.78)a -.00010 (-2.04)b -.00010 (-1.86)c
Provider fixed eﬀects Yesa Yesa Yesa Yesa
Patient controls No No Yesa Yesa
Time fixed eﬀects No No No Yesa
Pseudo R-squared .0105 .0105 .0112 .0113
Chow test (F -stat) - 14.15a 18.11a 5.69c
Observations 6,606 6,606 6,606 6,606
Providers 176 176 176 176
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2009m1-2011m12.
Notes: Average marginal eﬀects obtained from a fixed eﬀects fractional logit model. z-
statistics in parentheses have been calculated using standard errors obtained via the Delta
method. ap < :001; bp < :05; cp < :01 (for groups of variables they indicate the results of a
joint significance test). Chow test H0: 2 = 3 = 0.
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Table 5: Modelling last-minute cancellations across diﬀerent groups of patients.
Patient group ^1 (t-stat) ^2 (t-stat) ^3 (t-stat) R-sq. Chow F -stat
Males .00008(1.34) .00043(0.75) -.00014(-2.22)b .0105 3.48b
Females .00004(0.88) .00018(0.40) -.00010(-2.09)b .0095 2.83c
Age: 0-9 years -.00002(-0.11) .00018(0.14) -.00019(-1.19) .0159 0.72
Age: 10-19 years -.00015(-1.29) .00134(1.10) -.00012(-0.90) .0115 1.47
Age: 20-29 years -.00010(-1.16) -.00021(-0.23) .00008(0.89) .0146 0.48
Age: 30-39 years .00007(0.79) -.00064(-0.73) -.00009(-0.97) .0113 0.54
Age: 40-49 years .00002(0.23) .00072(0.96) -.00010(-1.36) .0107 1.61
Age: 50-59 years .00006(1.09) -.00031(-0.44) -.00008(-1.36) .0103 0.74
Age: 60-69 years .00002(0.38) .00060(1.04) -.00011(-1.68)c .0099 2.43c
Age: 70-79 years .00015(2.27)b .00055(0.89) -.00023(-3.08)a .0113 6.51a
Age: 80-89 years .00022(2.66)a .00018(0.19) -.00017(-1.82)c .0159 2.00
Age: 90 years .00003(0.14) .00298(1.22) .00011(0.39) .0310 0.77
Ethnic group: Indian .00044(3.16)a -.00241(-1.75)c -.00045(-3.11)a .0145 5.16b
Ethnic group: Black .00011(0.51) -.00095(-0.42) .00001(0.04) .0142 0.11
Ethnic group: Chinese .00002(0.05) -.00442(-0.80) .00020(0.42) .0201 0.70
Ethnic group: White .00005(1.19) .00039(0.84) -.00013(-2.50)b .0090 4.61b
Ethnic group: Other -.00008(-0.40) .00284(1.47) -.00012(-0.53) .0145 1.60
Ethnic group: Unknown -.00005(-0.64) -.00013(-0.18) .00001(0.15) .0139 0.03
Deprivation index: I -.00006(-1.05) .00082(1.37) -.00002(-0.33) .0089 1.19
Deprivation index: II .00007(1.40) .00050(0.89) -.00016(-2.78)a .0086 4.97b
Deprivation index: III .00009(1.70)c -.00014(-0.21) -.00014(-2.16)b .0089 2.35c
Deprivation index: IV .00002(0.36) .00050(0.73) -.00006(-0.85) .0097 1.01
Deprivation index: V .00016(1.94)c -.00031(-0.46) -.00022(-2.56)b .0115 3.27b
ICD chapter: I .00080(2.75)a -.00628(-1.77)c -.00081(-2.74)a .0141 4.08b
ICD chapter: II -.00004(-0.55) .00114(1.84)c -.00015(-1.35) .0128 2.58c
ICD chapter: III .00028(2.28)b -.00093(-0.71) -.00028(-2.20)b .0142 2.45c
ICD chapter: IV .00075(1.86)c -.00047(-0.08) -.00112(-1.62) .0623 1.42
ICD chapter: V -.00111(-1.04) .01392(1.31) .00032(0.25) .0588 0.88
ICD chapter: VI -.00021(-1.69)c .00242(2.06)b .00010(0.65) .0089 2.17
ICD chapter: VII -.00003(-0.25) .00122(1.00) .00013(0.89) .0222 1.25
ICD chapter: VIII .00035(1.53) -.00220(-0.86) -.00051(-1.84)c .0147 1.79
ICD chapter: IX -.00003(-0.31) .00180(1.57) -.00002(-0.15) .0095 1.27
ICD chapter: X -.00043(-1.65) .00137(0.49) -.00007(-0.24) .0258 0.18
ICD chapter: XI .00002(0.31) -.00027(-0.40) -.00001(-0.14) .0062 0.08
ICD chapter: XII .00011(0.68) .00002(0.01) -.00029(-1.59) .0078 1.37
ICD chapter: XIII -.00019(-1.68)c -.00033(-0.31) .00014(1.13) .0109 0.89
ICD chapter: XIV .00006(0.47) .00174(1.38) -.00013(-0.92) .0124 1.61
ICD chapter: XV -.00023(-1.41) .00079(0.46) .00021(1.17) .0489 0.70
ICD chapter: XVI -.00037(-0.43) .00745(0.65) -.00011(-0.11) .0721 0.21
ICD chapter: XVII -.00005(-0.20) .00189(0.70) -.00005(-0.14) .0119 0.24
ICD chapter: XVIII .00051(3.00)a .00041(0.26) -.00069(-3.17)a .0161 5.63b
ICD chapter: XIX -.00001(-0.03) .00223(0.69) -.00028(-1.00) .0150 0.94
ICD chapter: XXI .00048(3.30)a -.00202(-1.29) -.00034(-1.64) .0183 2.00
Foundation trust -.00003(-0.63) .00031(0.57) -.00003(-0.44) .0089 0.35
University hospital .00002(0.26) .00042(0.59) -.00012(-1.36) .0097 1.38
Specialist hospital .00018(1.67) -.00207(-1.53) -.00020(-1.25) .0131 4.31b
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2009m1-2011m12.
Notes: OLS estimates. t-statistics in parentheses have been calculated using standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering by provider. ap < :001; bp < :05; cp < :01.
Chow test H0: 2 = 3 = 0.
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Table A1: Sample distribution and definitions of principal diagnoses by ICD-10 codes.
Chapter Diagnosis block Frequency % ICD-10 definition
ICD-I A00-B99 43,699 0.23 Certain infectious and parasitic diseases
ICD-II C00-D48 3,223,788 17.28 Neoplasms
ICD-III D50-D89 373,562 2.00 Diseases of the blood and blood-forming or-
gans and certain disorders involving the im-
mune mechanism
ICD-IV E00-E90 264,282 1.42 Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases
ICD-V F00-F99 25,840 0.14 Mental and behavioural disorders
ICD-VI G00-G99 479,868 2.57 Diseases of the nervous system
ICD-VII H00-H59 1,536,648 8.24 Diseases of the eye and adnexa
ICD-VIII H60-H95 192,323 1.03 Diseases of the ear and mastoid process
ICD-IX I00-I99 1,066,880 5.72 Diseases of the circulatory system
ICD-X J00-J99 427,662 2.29 Diseases of the respiratory system
ICD-XI K00-K93 3,377,888 18.10 Diseases of the digestive system
ICD-XII L00-L99 414,972 2.22 Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue
ICD-XIII M00-M99 2,545,103 13.64 Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and con-
nective tissue
ICD-XIV N00-N99 1,561,740 8.37 Diseases of the genitourinary system
ICD-XV O00-O99 207,510 1.11 Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium
ICD-XVI P00-P96 5,158 0.03 Certain conditions originating in the perinatal
period
ICD-XVII Q00-Q99 216,449 1.16 Congenital malformations, deformations and
chromosomal abnormalities
ICD-XVIII R00-R99 1,180,386 6.33 Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and
laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified
ICD-XIX S00-T98 343,108 1.84 Injury, poisoning and certain other conse-
quences of external causes
ICD-XXI Z00-Z99 1,172,230 6.28 Factors influencing health status and contact
with health services
Total 18,659,096 100.00
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics, 2009m1-2011m12.
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Table A2: Full set of results on the rest covariates.
Full sample Restricted sample
Variable Coeﬀ. t-stat. Coeﬀ. t-stat.
Female -.00397a (-16.74) -.00397a (-13.33)
Age: 10-19 years -.00288b (-2.53) -.00230 (-1.50)
Age: 20-29 years .00117 (0.96) .00231 (1.54)
Age: 30-39 years .00026 (0.22) .00137 (0.96)
Age: 40-49 years .00057 (0.47) .00162 (1.11)
Age: 50-59 years .00112 (0.90) .00214 (1.43)
Age: 60-69 years .00158 (1.26) .00307b (2.03)
Age: 70-79 years .00368a (2.94) .00551a (3.62)
Age: 80-89 years .00706a (5.30) .00909a (5.56)
Age: 90 years .01391a (6.65) .01587a (6.14)
Ethnic group: Black .00287a (3.02) .00356a (3.03)
Ethnic group: Chinese -.00100 (-0.88) -.00186 (-1.30)
Ethnic group: White -.00512a (-8.34) -.00629a (-7.68)
Ethnic group: Other .00018 (0.27) .00367 (0.44)
Ethnic group: Unknown -.00790a (-10.86) -.01027a (-10.38)
Waiting time (log) .00337a (13.71) .00518a (16.58)
Transferred -.00111 (-0.45) - -
Discharged home .00526b (2.47) - -
ICD chapter: II .00523a (3.35) .00823a (4.49)
ICD chapter: III .00469b (3.09) .00495a (2.98)
ICD chapter: IV .01187a (3.46) .01752a (3.82)
ICD chapter: V .01525a (5.07) .02635a (6.55)
ICD chapter: VI .00169 (1.27) .00281c (1.83)
ICD chapter: VII .01342a (5.64) .01194a (4.68)
ICD chapter: VIII .01896a (11.49) .02662a (13.05)
ICD chapter: IX .01547a (9.86) .01654a (9.88)
ICD chapter: X .02114a (10.25) .04748a (13.95)
ICD chapter: XI .00756a (6.40) .00835a (6.26)
ICD chapter: XII .01869a (13.36) .01961a (12.51)
ICD chapter: XIII .01435a (11.12) .02354a (13.88)
ICD chapter: XIV .02048a (13.68) .03127a (16.55)
ICD chapter: XV .00687a (3.19) .01106a (4.65)
ICD chapter: XVI .00516 (1.32) .00910b (2.01)
ICD chapter: XVII .02266a (11.90) .03433a (13.71)
ICD chapter: XVIII .03561a (16.83) .03942a (17.14)
ICD chapter: XIX .02239a (12.01) .04352a (15.85)
ICD chapter: XXI .03674a (19.69) .04079a (19.41)
Deprivation index: II .00119a (8.70) .00146a (8.60)
Deprivation index: III .00256a (15.79) .00318a (15.60)
Deprivation index: IV .00557a (23.18) .00678a (23.14)
Deprivation index: V .00938a (25.20) .01135a (25.82)
Charlson score -.00028a (-2.96) -.00017 (-1.46)
Source: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES), 2009m1-2011m12.
Notes: OLS estimates. Models correspond to those in column 6 of Table 3. t-statistics in
parentheses have been calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and
clustering by provider. ap < :001; bp < :05; cp < :01.
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